Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111 c.e .) is well known, among other things, for his account, in al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (Deliverance from error), of a struggle with philosophical skepticism that bears a striking resemblance to that described by Descartes in the Meditations . This essay aims to give a close comparative analysis of these respective accounts, and will concentrate solely on the processes of invoking or entertaining doubt that al-Ghazālī and Descartes describe, respectively. In the process some subtle differences between them (...) in this regard will be brought to light that are relevant to the comparative issue of the respective solutions at which they arrive. The latter issue will not be touched upon here, although the present discussion is intended as a prelude to a future treatment of that topic. (shrink)

Occasionalism is the doctrine that God is the sole immediate cause of all events, to the exclusion of any causal participation on the part of creatures. While this doctrine clearly has interesting implications with regard to causation and the philosophy of natural science, few have noticed that it also seems to entail, not only that creatures have no causal power whatsoever, but that they are completely devoid of intrinsic natures, conceived as intrinsic dispositional properties. In this paper, I will outline (...) what is probably the first systematic argument for occasionalism, mounted by the eleventh-century Muslim, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and show how the implication in question follows from this argument. (shrink)

According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason (...) not as a resultance base, but as a specific type of which a resultance base is a token. But this picture of reasons cannot be correct. (shrink)

: Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and 'Acquisition' Edward Omar Moad In Al-Iqtişādfial-I'tiqād (Moderation in belief ), at the end of his chapter on divine power, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali writes, "No created thing comes about through another [created thing]. Rather, all come about through [divine] power." A precise understanding of what al-Ghazali means by this statement requires an understanding of his conception of power. Here, we will articulate this conception of power and show how it renders a distinctive (...) occasionalist thesis that follows from al-Ghazali's doctrine of the pervasiveness of divine power. Second, we will review an argument by al-Ghazali against natural necessity and show that the argument turns on the clear implication that, on empirical grounds, al-Ghazali's conception of power is the only understanding of causation that we have. This follows from an epistemology of power held by al-Ghazali that bears basic similarities to that of John Locke. Third, we will address the tension between such an epistemology of power and the implications of occasionalism with a look at al-Ghazali's discussion of the theory of kash, or 'acquisition.'. (shrink)

I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories "Islam, Iman," and "Ihsan" are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that "shari'a" refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding of "shari'a" as simply Islamic "law," and an alternative understanding of "usul al-fiqh" as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of (...) reason in Islamic moral epistemology via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī. (shrink)

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this (...) paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position is incoherent. (shrink)

Mythological language is sometimes understood as a way of representing, by concrete imagery, more abstract notions. In this paper, we will pose some metaphysical questions about the possibility of such a representation. These questions will serve to motivate a brief tour of Mishkāt al-Anwār (Niche of Lights)—Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s commentary on the famous ayat al-nur (“verse of light”) of the Qur’an—wherein is discussed, among other things, how symbolic imagery is possible, and “the respect in which the spirits of the meanings (...) are specified within the frames of the similitudes.”. (shrink)

It is a fundamental doctrine of the Abrahamic religions, following from the belief in God as the creator, that He is the primary cause of all natural phenomena. Some, however, have gone further, to claim that God is the only cause. Consequently, there are no genuine created, or secondary, causes. The western tradition has coined the term 'occasionalism' for this doctrine, according to which all apparent instances of secondary causation are just that---instances of merely apparent, or occasional, causation. The idea (...) being that, when a natural event is believed to have been caused by another, it is really only the case that it occurred on the occasion of the other. ;Taking, as its starting point, a particular version of the occasionalist doctrine articulated by the eleventh century Muslim theologian, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, we will trace the implications of the occasionalist thesis as they bear on the most obviously and directly relevant area of the philosophy of nature---that of the metaphysics of causation. We will develop the beginnings of one possible positive account of causation and material nature compatible with occasionalism, and possibly capable of sustaining an argument for the doctrine independently from theological commitments. What is hoped for is an embryo of a philosophy of nature compatible with occasionalism that can at least be evaluated for plausibility and satisfaction, and serve as a model for future development and/or retooling. (shrink)

If by “demon” one understands an evil occult being, then its equivalent in the Islamic narrative is the intersection of the category jinn with that of the shayātīn: a demon is a shaytān from among the jinn. The literature in the Islamic tradition on these subjects is vast. In what follows, we will select some key elements from it to provide a brief summary: first on the nature of the jinn, their nature, and their relationship to God and human beings; (...) second, on the origin, nature, and role of Shaytān (Satan himself) and the shayātīn in the moral drama of Islam. Then, we will take a closer look at the relationship between jinn and humankind, according to Islam, and the phenomena of the demonic as it manifests itself in that relation. In the process, I will entertain, tentatively, some philosophical speculation as to the nature of that ultimately mysterious relation and phenomena, drawn from what we find in the religious sources. (shrink)

The object of this paper is not arguments from contingency in general, but specifically Aquinas’s ‘Third Way’ as it appears in his Summa Theologica. I will raise three objections to this argument. First, the argument depends on the premise, that if everything were contingent, then there would have been a time during which nothing exists, but this is not self-evident and no argument is given for it here. Secondly, Aquinas tells us that a key premise in this argument, that an (...) infinite order of things necessary through one another is impossible, has been proven just previously (in the ‘second way’) with respect to an infinite order of efficient causes. But this argument fallaciously equivocates between two different senses of the term ‘first’, and the fallacy does not disappear when applied to the ‘third way’. Thus, Aquinas not only fails, in this argument, to prove the existence of a thing necessary in itself, but fails to prove that anything is necessary at all. Lastly, this argument suffers from a puzzling ambiguity as to the meaning of the term ‘necessity’, and either way of interpreting the term consistently in the argument raises difficulties. (shrink)

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali leveled a critique against twenty propositions of the Muslim peripatetic philosophers, represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. In the Fourth Discussion of this work, he rejects their claim to having proven the existence of God. The proof to which he objects is none other than the famous ‘argument from contingency.’ So why did the eminent theologian of Islamic orthodoxy reject an argument for God’s existence that ultimately became so historically influential? (...) I will show that the real targets of Ghazali’s objection are the philosophers’ doctrine of the pre-eternity of the world, and their denial of divine attributes. These two issues are linked in such a way that, only if the philosophers’ argument regarding the divine essence is sound, would they be able to prove that He exists while holding to the doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity. (shrink)

Occasionalism is the doctrine that relegates all real causal efficacy exclusively to God. This paper will aim to elucidate in some detail the metaphysical considerations that, together with certain common medieval theological axioms, constitute the philosophical steps leading to this doctrine. First, I will explain how the doctrine of divine conservation implies that we should attribute to divine power causal immediacy in every natural event and that it rules out mere conservationism as a model of the causal relation between God (...) and nature. This leaves concurrentism and occasionalism as the only compatible options. Then I will explain the argument that since no coherent conception of divine concurrence is possible, occasionalism emerges as the only model of the causal relation between God and nature compatible with the doctrine of divine conservation. (shrink)

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) is said to be the first scholar to make history and society the direct objects of a systematic science. This paper will examine the role of occasionalism in his thought. This question is interesting because a perennial objection to occasionalism has been that it denies any real natural order, and therefore precludes the possibility of any systematic natural science. If Ibn Khaldun was an occasionalist, then it would mean that one of the earliest pioneers in attempting to (...) apply a systematic scientific method to the study of history and society did so on the basis of an occasionalist understanding of nature and natural order. Then the question of whether and how his scientific methodology is compatible with occasionalism is of interest for both historical and theoretical reasons, in particular for theists who are exploring occasionalism as a potential framework for a coherent understanding of the natural world (including, in this case, its human and social dimensions) as both the manifestation of divine providence and creativity, and as an object of systematic empirical science. (shrink)

Robert Adams characterizes actualism regarding possible worlds as «the view that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be nonactual possible worlds, they must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things which there are in the actual world, and which are not identical with nonactual possibles.» In this paper, I will briefly explain actualism about possible worlds, showing that an essential pillar of the theory is the (...) claim that truth is distinct from, and ontologically prior to, truth in a world. The rest of the paper is premised on the idea that an interesting philosophical defense of this claim calls for an analysis of truth itself, and is not intended as an objection to actualism, but rather to underscore the interest actualists should have in the question of what truth is. First, I will consider the idea, drawn from Adams and Alan McMichael, that truth differs from truth in a world in its being a matter of correspondence between a proposition and an independent object; that object being, in McMichael's words, the `concrete universe'. Then, I will show that, given such an analysis of truth, the truth conditions for propositions about non-actual possibilities violate the central tenet of actualism, as articulated by Adams. (shrink)

This paper examines recent deployments of Wittgenstein’s thought, by Mustafa (2018) and Asad (2020), in defense of the Islamic “traditionalism” of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school. I will briefly summarize the key features of Wittgenstein’s thought crucial to this, and then examine their ramifications. I argue that Wittgenstein’s position actually undermines any claim to interpretive authority, whether of the “rationalist” or salafi “traditionalist” sort. Secondly, the approach to religious language most commonly associated with Wittgenstein—so-called “Wittgensteinian Fideism” may pose bigger (...) problems for traditionalists than the influence of classical philosophy or “rationalist” theological responses to modern skeptical challenges. (shrink)

This paper will survey the most prominent contemporary analyses of causation, and evaluate their compatibility, or otherwise, with the doctrine of Occasionalism, with the ultimate aim of formulating an occasionalist analysis of causation. Though reductive analyses of causation are incompatible with Occasionalism, it seems that the denial of reductionism is as well. I will suggest a solution to the problem, involving an analysis of causation as the relation of extensional identity, between God’s will that an event actually occur, and the (...) intensionally distinct event itself. (shrink)

Michael Dummett, in ‘Truth,’ mounted an objection to the redundancy theory of truth on the grounds that it neglects to account for the normative features he claimed are part of the concept of truth. Paul Horwich, in ‘The Minimalist Conception of Truth’, notes that the same objection could be leveled against minimalism. He defends minimalism against Dummett’s objection by offering a sketch of an instrumental account of the desirability of truth that is compatible with the minimalist thesis. In this paper, (...) I will review Dummett’s objection and Horwich’s response, identifying some concerns with the account as it stands. I will modify the account to address those concerns, and so that it successfully explains the desirability of having all true beliefs in a way that is compatible with minimalism. I then mount an argument that truth is also intrinsically valuable. The question regarding the adequacy of the minimalist account of truth, then, hinges on whether the account is compatible with the fact of truth’s intrinsic value, along with the question of whether that fact entails its also being essentially valuable. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will make the case that we can accurately describe Ghazali’s position as a natural law theory. Kevin Reinhart (1995), on whose translation of al-Mustaṣfā I will be depending in what follows, has also treated this topic. Though he did not specifically compare Ghazali’s position there with natural law theory, like Hourani (1985) he interprets Ghazali’s position as subjectivist on key points rendering it incompatible with natural law theory. Thus, I will begin with a prima facie case (...) for this incompatibility roughly along the lines one finds in Reinhart, and argue that a closer examination of the relevant text of al-Mustaṣfā along with the parallel section of al-Iqtiṣād, also cited by Hourani, shows that Ghazali’s position is not conclusively subjectivist, but instead is compatible with a natural law theory. I will examine key sections of Ghazali’s Kimiya al-Sa’dāt that quite clearly express a natural law theory of morality. (shrink)

Michael Dummett, in ‘Truth,’ mounted an objection to the redundancy theory of truth on the grounds that it neglects to account for the normative features he claimed are part of the concept of truth. Paul Horwich, in ‘The Minimalist Conception of Truth’, notes that the same objection could be leveled against minimalism. He defends minimalism against Dummett’s objection by offering a sketch of an instrumental account of the desirability of truth that is compatible with the minimalist thesis. In this paper, (...) I will review Dummett’s objection and Horwich’s response, identifying some concerns with the account as it stands. I will modify the account to address those concerns, and so that it successfully explains the desirability of having all true beliefs in a way that is compatible with minimalism. I then mount an argument that truth is also intrinsically valuable. The question regarding the adequacy of the minimalist account of truth, then, hinges on whether the account is compatible with the fact of truth’s intrinsic value, along with the question of whether that fact entails its also being essentially valuable. (shrink)

"The debate recorded in al-Ghazālī's Incoherence of the Philosophers, and Ibn Rushd's response in Incoherence of the Incoherence, is one of the most philosophically interesting events in the history of classical Islamic thought. Here, the cutting edge of Ghazālī's searching critique meets the depth of Ibn Rushd's philosophical insight in a clash over the innovative synthesis of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought represented chiefly by Ibn Sīnā. This critical commentary closely analyses and evaluates the arguments deployed by all three parties in (...) the debate, wherein are raised questions about the origin of the universe and the reality of time, possibility, causality, and nature. Where opportunities arise, it actively engages in the discussion by suggesting alternative arguments and philosophical directions. It goes beyond the cliché construal of the Incoherence debate as simply a conflict between faith and reason, exposing it as a genuinely philosophical enterprise and a potential source of fresh perspectives on contemporary discussions in metaphysics and analytic theology"--. (shrink)

This introduction to the life and thought of Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Yahya Qawami al-Shirazi, is part of the Makers of Islamic Civilization series, conceived by the Oxford Centre for Islamic studies, edited by Farhan Nizami, and published by Oxford University Press. The self-described aim of the series is to provide a set of introductory texts on outstanding figures in the history of Islamic civilization. This volume represents an important contribution to the literature on a neglected period of Islamic philosophy, (...) by a scholar who is emerging as one of the most important contemporary Muslim thinkers.Ibrahim Kalin states his own aims in the book in terms of its four main... (shrink)

This study delves into the intricate world of tipping, examining how restaurant chefs and chef-owners account for and morally justify this practice. While previous research has paved the way for understanding several of the nuances of tipping in the dining experience, little attention has been given to chefs’ perspectives on its moral dimensions. In today’s evolving restaurant dining landscape, tipping practices have become increasingly contentious. Therefore, it is imperative to grasp the ethical intricacies of tipping experiences, as they hold significant (...) implications for social and economic interactions. This study focuses on interviews with culinary artisans—the masterminds behind the dining experience, including executive chefs, chef-owners, sous chefs, chefs de cuisine, private chefs, and pop-up chefs. Through these conversations, we explore the moral justifications for tipping, unintended consequences that arise, and the advent of tip coercion. Our findings shed light on the moral reasoning and ethical dynamics behind tipping practices. These findings offer a foundation for shaping theoretical frameworks, informing practical solutions, and guiding policy decisions in this complex realm. (shrink)

The ethics review system of research is now well-established, at least in the developed world, although there are many differences in how countries view it and go about managing it. The UK specifically is now seeking to revise its system by speeding up the process of ethics approval but only for some studies. It is proposed that only those studies which pose “no material ethical issues” should be “fast-tracked”. However, it is unclear what this means, who should decide and what (...) should be included in this category. In this paper, we go some way towards answering these questions. While we are certain that the debate is only just beginning, we are equally certain that it will continue to run long after the system has been reformed. To stimulate this conversation and to inform a pilot project of the new system directly, we review two candidates to help give some substance to the notion of “material” ethical issues. Firstly, material could mean a certain type or degree of risk. Second, material could mean how physically invasive the research is. We conclude that there is still much work to be done on making the system of governing health and social care consistent and practicable. (shrink)

This study delves into the intricate world of tipping, examining how restaurant chefs and chef-owners account for and morally justify this practice. While previous research has paved the way for understanding several of the nuances of tipping in the dining experience, little attention has been given to chefs’ perspectives on its moral dimensions. In today’s evolving restaurant dining landscape, tipping practices have become increasingly contentious. Therefore, it is imperative to grasp the ethical intricacies of tipping experiences, as they hold significant (...) implications for social and economic interactions. This study focuses on interviews with culinary artisans—the masterminds behind the dining experience, including executive chefs, chef-owners, sous chefs, chefs de cuisine, private chefs, and pop-up chefs. Through these conversations, we explore the moral justifications for tipping, unintended consequences that arise, and the advent of tip coercion. Our findings shed light on the moral reasoning and ethical dynamics behind tipping practices. These findings offer a foundation for shaping theoretical frameworks, informing practical solutions, and guiding policy decisions in this complex realm. (shrink)

welcomed by a new generation of students and scholars in all branches of learning.

In many learning or inference tasks human behavior approximates that of a Bayesian ideal observer, suggesting that, at some level, cognition can be described as Bayesian inference. However, a number of findings have highlighted an intriguing mismatch between human behavior and standard assumptions about optimality: People often appear to make decisions based on just one or a few samples from the appropriate posterior probability distribution, rather than using the full distribution. Although sampling-based approximations are a common way to implement Bayesian (...) inference, the very limited numbers of samples often used by humans seem insufficient to approximate the required probability distributions very accurately. Here, we consider this discrepancy in the broader framework of statistical decision theory, and ask: If people are making decisions based on samples—but as samples are costly—how many samples should people use to optimize their total expected or worst-case reward over a large number of decisions? We find that under reasonable assumptions about the time costs of sampling, making many quick but locally suboptimal decisions based on very few samples may be the globally optimal strategy over long periods. These results help to reconcile a large body of work showing sampling-based or probability matching behavior with the hypothesis that human cognition can be understood in Bayesian terms, and they suggest promising future directions for studies of resource-constrained cognition. (shrink)

Given Heidegger’s inflammatory remarks about the intellectual poverty of modern logic, it may come as a surprise to be told that he has something to contribute to the philosophy of logic. One of the rewards of Daniel Dahlstrom’s Heidegger’s Concept of Truth is its argument that Heidegger can illuminate such issues in the philosophy of logic as the character of propositions, the nature of bivalence, and the concept of truth. Dahlstrom focuses on Heidegger’s work in the years immediately before and (...) after the publication of Being and Time, with particular emphasis on the lecture courses from this period, especially the one published as Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. (shrink)

Peterson et al. (2023) present a range of ethical issues that arise when considering the use of psychedelic substances within medicine. But psychedelics are, by their nature, boundary-dissolving, a...

This is a two page handout specifying approaches, or methods, used in interpreting Judith Butler. The methods of various analytic philosophers are identified.

Frege and Heidegger appear to appear to have diametrically opposed attitudes towards logic. Frege thinks logic must govern any investigation whatsoever, whereas Heidegger (in "What is Metaphysics?") apparently wants to dismantle logic. But when they try to explicate the nature of judgment, a striking similarity emerges. For while their accounts of judgment are radically different, each finds his account to be, by his own lights, _inexpressible<D>. This paper shows how Heidegger and Frege arrive at their respective accounts of judgment, explains (...) why they regard the status of their accounts as problematic, and explores and evaluates their responses to their parallel predicaments. (shrink)

This timely book examines the interaction of health research and regulation with law through empirical analysis and the application of key anthropological concepts to reveal the inner workings of human health research. Through ground-breaking empirical inquiry, Regulatory Stewardship of Health Research explores how research ethics committees (RECs) work in practice to both protect research participants and promote ethical research.This thought-provoking book provides new perspectives on the regulation of health research by demonstrating how RECs and other regulatory actors seek to fulfil (...) these two functions by performing a role of 'regulatory stewardship'. This involves guiding researchers through stages of research approval, as well as seeking to maximise benefits for participants and society while minimising risks. Arguing that participant protection and research promotion should rightly be treated as twin objectives for health research regulators, this book asserts that there is a need for more overt recognition of the importance and function of the deliberative space in which RECs can negotiate the risks relevant to a research application.This book is a key resource for academics and students interested in health research and regulation, and the dynamic interaction of ethics and the law. Regulators and policy-makers will also find it to be an insightful and illuminating text for the practical insights that it reveals about research governance in action. (shrink)

This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.